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Abstract
This paper explores the tension between openness and prudence in AI research, ev-
ident in two core principles of the Montréal Declaration for Responsible AI. While
the AI community has strong norms around open sharing of research, concerns
about the potential harms arising from misuse of research are growing, prompting
some to consider whether the field of AI needs to reconsider publication norms.
We discuss how different beliefs and values can lead to differing perspectives on
how the AI community should manage this tension, and explore implications for
what responsible publication norms in AI research might look like in practice.
1 Introduction
Concerns about the societal implications of advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have risen dramat-
ically in recent years. Many organisations and initiatives have also begun to develop principles and
declarations to ensure that AI is developed and used responsibly [1]. One challenge for implement-
ing these principles in practice is that doing so introduces tensions: between different principles, and
between principles and other things we value [2].
One such tension is that between prudence and openness in AI research. This tension is evident in
two core principles of the Montréal Declaration: the prudence principle states that “when the misuse
of an AI systems endangers public health or safety and has a high probability of occurrence, it is
prudent to restrict open access and public dissemination” (p.15) and yet the democratic participation
principle states conversely that “artificial intelligence research should remain open and accessible
to all.” (p.12) This tension raises particularly challenging questions for publication norms in AI
research: how should the AI community approach the publication of research which has the potential
to be used for harm? [3]
Our aim in this paper is not to answer the question of when or how AI research should be published,
but to facilitate more nuanced discussion of this issue in the AI community by laying out some
important considerations. In particular, we suggest the need to better understand both (a) why dif-
ferent groups disagree on this issue, and what beliefs underpin differing perspectives, and (b) what
‘rethinking publication norms’ might actually look like in practice. With a fuller understanding of
both of these, we hope the community can begin to explore whether there are ways of rethinking
publication norms which carefully balance the tension between openness and prudence.
2 The tension between openness and prudence
The AI research community has strong norms around openness. This is clear in, for example, com-
munity backlash against the closed access Nature Machine Intelligence journal [4], and the fact that
many top conferences are moving towards open review and demanding code and dataset releases.
Openness in research is valuable for many reasons, including ensuring that the benefits of research
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are distributed widely, and enabling scientific progress by helping researchers build on one another’s
work.
However, concerns about potential harms arising from the misuse of advances in AI research are
growing [5, 6]. This is not a new problem: many other fields, including biotechnology and computer
science more broadly, have wrestled with questions of how to manage research with potential for
‘dual-use’ [7, 8]. This has prompted some to consider whether the field of AI needs to reconsider
norms around how research is published and disseminated.
The AI community currently appears divided on this issue. In February, research lab OpenAI an-
nounced that they would not be immediately releasing the full version of their most recent language
model, GPT-2, due to “concerns about malicious applications” [9]. While some came out in support
of the decision and emphasised the importance of conversation around this issue, many prominent
researchers were openly very critical [10], for example suggesting that withholding the model was
futile or a disingenuous media strategy to create hype. We do not focus specifically on the case of
GPT-2 in this paper, but highlight it here to illustrate how controversial this issue can easily become.
3 Core disagreements
Clearly, AI researchers hold varying opinions on how we should balance the tension between open-
ness and prudence in AI research. In order to have a more substantive and productive conversation,
it is worth unpacking these disagreements a little more.
In some cases, disagreements may come down to fundamentally different peronal values: someone
who takes openness in research as a fundamental value or places extremely high priority on it may
disagree with any proposal to restrict release on principle. However, there are many different reasons
to value both openness and prudence in research, and in most cases we hypothesise that the relative
value one assigns to each can be understood in terms of more specific beliefs about why and how
each is important. We highlight three types of beliefs which appear particularly central to assessing
the relative importance of openness vs. prudence: (a) beliefs about risks; (b) beliefs about efficacy;
and (c) beliefs about future needs.
Beliefs about risks: As we have discussed, a central concern related to openness is that research
advances could be misused by malicious actors in harmful or even catastrophic ways. But prudence
in the release of research also creates its own risks: reduced openness could decrease inclusivity and
increase concentration of power, giving disproportionate control over AI advances to a few wealthy
research groups and nations.
Beliefs about efficacy: Different groups may also disagree about how effective restricted release
will be at mitigating malicious use in practice. One reason for scepticism is that if there’s sufficient
motivation to develop a technology, another group is likely to develop and release it anyway. On the
other hand, delayed or coordination release might still make a substantial difference if it allows time
to build defences against misuse, as is common in computer security [11].
Beliefs about future needs: If it is likely that more advanced AI systems will be developed soon
with much greater potential for harm, then it may be worth beginning to develop forward thinking
publication norms and processes, regardless of whether they are needed for current systems.
However, if more advanced and potentially harmful capabilities are unlikely for a long time, then
developing such processes now may be less valuable.
Focusing on these more specific disagreements, rather than extreme positions of ‘openness’ versus
‘prudence’ may help reduce polarization and enable researchers with differing positions to better
understand one another and balance tradeoffs.
4 Rethinking publication norms
Different beliefs about risks, efficacy and future needs can lead to differing perspectives on whether
the AI community needs to rethink publication norms. But what exactly does it mean to ‘rethink
publication norms’?
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A number of research groups and labs have already started tackling these questions. One of the most
notable public positions in this space comes from Google, which states that “We generally seek to
share Google research to contribute to growing the wider AI ecosystem. However we do not make
it available without first reviewing the potential risks for abuse. Although each review is content
specific, key factors that we consider in making this judgment include: risk and scale of benefit vs
downside, nature and uniqueness, and mitigation options.” [12]
As Google’s emphasis on context-specificity highlights, there are many different options for how
research might be published. This section outlines some of these different dimensions and decisions
that need to be considered in thinking about publication norms in AI research. Our discussion draws
substantially on our understanding of established practices in biotechnology and computer security,
which have both dealt with similar issues.
In practice, to think carefully about publication norms the AI community needs to consider (at least)
five different questions:
1. What different options are there for how research is released?
2. Under what circumstances should different types of release be used?
3. What processes should govern how these decisions about release type are made?
4. Who should be involved in making these decisions?
5. Who or what should manage (and fund) all of the above?
For example, the question "what different options are there for how research is released?" can be
broken down into three different aspects: (1) content: what is released, (2) timing: when it is re-
leased, and (3) distribution: where/who it is released to. (See [6] for a more detailed breakdown of
release options).
Different combinations of content, timing and distribution options will pose different risks depend-
ing on the domain and potential risks of malicious use vs. concentration of power. It is worth
considering here different factors that influence the likelihood of a capability being used to cause sig-
nificant harm: including the awareness and attention of malicious actors; what skills and resources
are required to actually deploy a capability in practice; and whether the ‘return on investment’ for
using a capability is high enough for adversaries to continue using it in practice.
Even given current publication norms in AI research, the default for publication is often not the most
‘open’ option in each of these categories. Few researchers or labs always publish fully runnable
systems based on their research, and they often do not publish the amount of detail - models, data,
and source code - that would be required for a straightforward replication. Researchers do not invest
equally in media campaigns for every publication, and instead selectively choose which research
outputs to distribute to which audiences. Of course, this does not mean that these practices are
perfect or should be used to justify reducing openness further. But it does highlight that the research
community doess, in practice, already consider different options for how research is released - often
for more practical and commercial reasons.
Finally, considering the variety of different options for how research is released highlights the im-
portance of the other questions: who gets to make these decisions, what processes are required, and
how all of this can be managed and funded. Both biotechnology and computer security, which have
some precedent for restricting release of outputs of potentially harmful research, have established
procedures and institutions underpinning these decisions. Biosafety practices include processes for
classifying the risk level of different microorganisms, determined by specialist organisations [7].
Similarly, computer security has processes for responsibly disclosing critical information with po-
tential for misuse, which are managed by entities such as Information Security and Analysis Centres
[13]. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail what such processes and insti-
tutions might look like for AI research, we think these questions are crucially important and would
like to encourages future research and experimentation to explore them more thoroughly.
5 Is it possible to balance prudence and openness?
Prudence in AI research is not simply a matter of restricting what gets published. Rather, we suggest
that being prudent requires establishing norms, processes, and potentially institutions for assessing
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when the risks of research outweigh the benefits, and deciding what to do in those situations. Though
this notion of prudence conflicts with openness in the most absolute sense, it may be possible to
establish processes which mitigate the greatest risks of malicious use while retaining many of the
most important benefits of openness.
For example, the concern that reduced openness may increase power concentration could be sub-
stantially mitigated by having well-established processes and institutions governing how publication
decisions get made: ensuring that such decisions have legitimacy and that research labs cannot use
misuse as an excuse for simply keeping research advances to themselves. Similarly, coordinated
approaches to communicating about decisions to restrict or delay release could help prevent public
mistrust and confusion.
Release of outputs is also not the only part of the research process where it may be possible to miti-
gate the danger of malicious use. For example, perhaps there would be less of a threat to openness if
risk assessment could be done at the beginning of the research process to identify areas with potential
for harm, leading to decisions not to pursue those directions or to monitor them more closely. This
is common in biomedical and behavioural research, where research proposals have to be submitted
to institutional review boards (IRBs) which assess whether they pose any risk to human subjects
[14], though the current implementation of IRBs poses its own significant efficiency tradeoffs which
need to be thought through. Of course, this is challenging precisely because much of AI research
involves developing very general capabilities which can then be used for a variety of different pur-
poses. However, better risk assessment may still be useful for identifying some avenues of research
that are not worth prioritising.
6 Recommendations
In order to find a careful balance between openness and prudence in AI research, we suggest that
future work should:
• Aim to better understand risks of misuse across different areas of AI research, e.g. by
conducting threat modelling in collaboration with relevant subject matter experts outside
of the AI research community (for example, misinformation security experts for the case
of synthetic media research);
• More thoroughly investigate potential harms of reduced openness in AI research, in-
cluding by (a) more substantively engaging with different communities to understand con-
cerns; and (b) better understanding how these harms have arisen, and to what extent they
have been dealt with, in other fields;
• Explore different options for publication norms and processes and their real-world im-
pacts in much more detail, using the questions highlighted in 4 as a starting point. This
would require publication venues and academic and industry labs to actively experiment
with different approaches and share findings on practical challenges, solutions, and out-
comes.
More generally, we suggest the need to build a community around exploring these issues, with es-
tablished venues for discussion and learning: for example by running regular workshops specifically
on responsible research norms and practices at all major AI conferences.
7 Conclusion
The Montréal Declaration suggests that both openness and prudence are important for responsibility
in AI research: but is it possible to respect both at the same time? We believe that it is, though
balancing the two will not be straightforward. Our aim in this paper has been to make the case
that this requires developing norms and processes which more carefully balance these two important
values. This work needs to begin by more thoroughly understanding the potential risks associated
with both openness and prudence in research, and by considering a much wider range of possible
approaches to responsible publication norms. This requires considering not just how research gets
released but who gets to make these decisions, and what processes and institutions are necessary to
legitimise the decision-making process.
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